Public law in the tax tribunals and the case for reform by Daly, Stephen
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Daly, S. (2018). Public law in the tax tribunals and the case for reform. British Tax Review.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. Sep. 2019
Reprinted from  
British Tax Review 
Issue 1, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweet & Maxwell 
5 Canada Square 
Canary Wharf 
London 
E14 5AQ  
 (Law Publishers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To subscribe, please go to 
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/catalogue/productdetails.aspx?recordid=33
8&productid=6614.  
 
Full text articles from the British Tax Review are also available via subscription 
to www.westlaw.co.uk, or https://www.checkpointworld.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Law in the Tax Tribunals and the Case for
Reform
Stephen Daly*
Abstract
The central thesis of this article is that: first, the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tax Tribunal to deal with
typical public law complaints is limited; and, secondly, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should be broadened,
as this would be more efficient and because the Tribunal judges have the requisite experience and ability.
Introduction
Consider the following example. A taxpayer has an assessment issued against them by HMRC.
The taxpayer’s argument is that the tax is not due under the relevant taxing provision or, in the
alternative, that they are entitled to rely upon Extra-Statutory Concession “A19 Arrears of tax
arising through official error” (ESCA19) which provides that HMRCmay give up tax due where
the body has failed to make timely use of information supplied by the taxpayer.1 In such a case,
the taxpayer will have to institute two separate sets of proceedings. In one set of proceedings
the taxpayer will appeal against the assessment to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT).2 In the second
set of proceedings the taxpayer will institute judicial review proceedings in the Administrative
Court claiming a legitimate expectation that they were entitled to rely upon ESC A19 (or that
HMRC’s decision not to apply the concession was irrational).3 This situation is entirely
unsatisfactory. The result in one set of proceedings may render the result in the other redundant,
with the effect being a waste of time and money for all concerned. In such a case, why should
the expertly constituted FTT not have the capacity to resolve both disputes?
*Lecturer at the University of Birmingham. The author would like to thank Dr J. Avery Jones, Dr P. Daly, R. Kennedy
and the two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the piece. Different iterations also
benefited from comments of those attending the annual conference of the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA),
5–7 April 2017, the 5th Annual Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC) workshop, 26 and 27 April 2017 and
in particular from the comments of Professors P. Cane, R. Kirkham, R. Thomas, J. Latham of the Civil, Family and
Tribunals Directorate, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, and Judges Nick Wikeley and Nick O’Brien at an early
career workshop, New Voices in Administrative Justice (1 September 2017), at the University of Sheffield. Any errors
are the sole responsibility of the author.
1HMRC, Extra-Statutory Concessions: ex-Inland Revenue (6 April 2017), “A19. Arrears of tax arising through official
error”, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extra-statutory-concessions-ex-inland-revenue
[Accessed 7 February 2018].
2Note that the taxpayer is entitled to ask for an internal review whereby the decision is reviewed by somebody who
was not involved in the original assessment before proceeding to appeal to the tribunal. On which, see TMA 1970
ss.49A–49I.
3 It should, however, be noted that as judicial review is a remedy of last resort, a taxpayer will often first be required
to seek an internal review and perhaps even approach the Adjudicator’s Office. On this, see R. (on the application of
NCM 2000 Ltd) v HMRC [2015] EWHC 1342 (Admin) at [51]–[59] and also R. (on the application of Glencore
Energy UK Ltd) v HMRC (Glencore) [2017] EWCA Civ 1716 at [51]–[71]; [2017] WLR(D) 723 (Sales LJ).
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This article seeks to demonstrate that the underlying restriction is unjustified. Further, there
are considerable practical benefits to extending the ambit of the FTT’s jurisdiction. This article
will propose that taxpayers should be allowed to bring public law issues before the FTT where
there is in addition a substantive dispute. The FTT is the forumwhich is best placed for resolving
such cases. This proposal develops a similar proposal which was first aired almost a quarter of
a century ago by Dr John Avery Jones.4
The article is set out in three parts. The first part will set out briefly the current position in
relation to the bringing of public law claims in the tax tribunals. The second part will set out the
case for extending the jurisdiction of the FTT. The third part will examine the options for reform.
Finally, it should be noted that this article will only assess the viability of extending the jurisdiction
of the FTT although a similar argument could be made for reforming the jurisdiction of other
tribunals.
The current position
As a general rule, public law issues must be argued by way of judicial review in the courts, rather
than in the tax tribunals. The reason for this is that the tribunals are creatures of statute, whereas
judicial review is grounded in the “ancient and inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the court”.5
If the tribunals are to have any jurisdiction to hear public law issues this can, accordingly, only
occur where the tribunals have been granted such jurisdiction by Parliament. There is provision
for the tribunals to consider public law matters in certain specified circumstances. For the most
part, this arises only in the case of the Upper Tribunal (UT), which was made a superior court
of record by the governing Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007) with
jurisdiction equivalent, therefore, to that of the High Court. For instance, litigants may apply to
the Administrative Court to have their judicial review case heard by the UT.6 The Administrative
Court must be satisfied that transferring the case would be “just and convenient”.7 There are
instances also where the FTTmay hear public law issues, provided jurisdiction has been statutorily
conferred, as further examined below.8
For a time, it seemed possible that a broad reading of the legislative provisions could prevail,
allowing for a greater range of public law issues to be considered by the FTT. InOxfam v HMRC
(Oxfam),9 Mr Justice Sales (as he then was) considered that the jurisdiction of the FTT to hear
public law claims was broader than previously understood. Sales J discussed at length the issue
of bringing legitimate expectation claims before the FTT.10 He held that the FTT did have
jurisdiction to hear the public law claim. This was justified by reference to the statutory scheme.
4 J.F. Avery Jones, “Tax appeals: the case for reform” [1994] BTR 3, 13. See also Committee on Enforcement Powers
of the Revenue Departments (Kinkel Committee), Vols 1 and 2 (1983), Cmnd.8822, para.25.4.13 onwards.
5C. Turpin and A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 7th edn (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 661.
6See generally TCEA 2007 ss.15–21.
7Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31A(3); TCEA 2007 s.19(1).
8See below, “Competence of the First-tier Tax Tribunal”, in text at fn.48 onwards.
9Oxfam v HMRC [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [73]; [2010] STC 686. The decision on jurisdiction has been followed
in its immediate aftermath. See for instance Hanover Company Services Ltd v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 256 (TC) at
[27]–[42]; [2010] SFTD 1047 at 1054–1060.
10Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [61]–[79].
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The relevant provision allowing for appeal in the case, section 83(c) of the Value Added Tax
Act 1994 (VATA 1994), provided that
“an appeal shall lie to a tribunal with respect to…the amount of any input tax which may
be credited to a person”.11
This provision gave the FTT a broad jurisdiction to consider any legal question, including a
public law question, capable of being determinative of the issue of the amount of input tax which
should be credited to a taxpayer.12 Such an interpretation was defensible on the basis that the
FTT is particularly well positioned to make judgements about the fair treatment of taxpayers by
HMRC and it avoids the cost, delay and potential injustice and confusion associated with
proliferation of proceedings.13 It is plausible that Parliament would have had the avoidance of
these issues in mind when drafting the provision.14
The reasoning of Sales J aligns broadly with that of the Supreme Court in the subsequent case
of R. (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal (Cart).15 The Supreme Court there took a
broad reading of TCEA 2007 in order to develop a means of judicially reviewing decisions of
the UT. Although the statute states that the UT is a superior court of record,16 the Supreme Court
held that this did not preclude judicial review of the UT’s decisions. In terms of the mechanics
of such judicial review, the Supreme Court used the language of TCEA 2007 to develop a novel,
pragmatic (although doctrinally empty)17 approach that the courts ought to take.18 The Supreme
Court justified the invention inter alia by reference to the need to spare judicial resources.19 To
this end, the judgment supports Sales J’s assessment in Oxfam,20 specifically, that having two
sets of proceedings dealing with effectively the same issue is a poor use of judicial resources
and hence contrary to the intention of Parliament.21
The Supreme Court judgment inCart22was not, however, mentioned inNoor v HMRC (Noor),23
which has in practice been taken to have restricted considerably the scope of Sales J’s judgment
in Oxfam.24 The UT in Noor25 also considered the issue of whether or not the FTT could hear
11VATA 1994 s.83(c).
12Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [63].
13Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [70].
14Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [70].
15R. (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; [2011] MHLR 196; [2011] STC 1659.
16TCEA 2007 s.3(5).
17M. Elliott and R. Thomas, “Tribunal justice and proportionate dispute resolution” (2012) 71(2) CLJ 297, 309; M.
Elliott and R. Thomas, Cart and Eba—the new tribunals system and the courts (UK Constitutional Law Association
Blog, 5 October 2011), available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/10/05/mark-elliott-and-robert-thomas-cart
-and-eba%E2%80%94the-new-tribunals-system-and-the-courts/ [Accessed 8 February 2018].
18On which see Cart, above fn.15, [2011] UKSC 28 at [128]–[134] (Lord Dyson).
19 Elliott and Thomas (2012), above fn.17, 312. See Cart, above fn.15, [2011] UKSC 28 at [47] (Lady Hale), [89]
(Lord Phillips), [100] (Lord Brown), [104] (Lord Clarke), [124]–[126] (Lord Dyson).
20Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [5].
21It is notable likewise that TCEA 2007 was intended to produce a coherent structure for the delivery of administrative
justice. Lord Chancellor’s Department, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service—Report of the Review of
Tribunals by Sir Andrew Leggatt, Terms of Reference (Leggatt Report) (March 2001).
22Cart, above fn.15, [2011] UKSC 28.
23Noor v HMRC [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC); [2013] STC 998.
24Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch).
25Noor, above fn.23, [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC).
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issues of public law and responded powerfully to the judgment in Oxfam.26 The judgment in
Noor27 is particularly significant as it was handed down by the (then) President of the Tax and
Chancery Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, Mr Justice Warren, and the President of the First-tier
Tribunal Tax Chamber, Judge Bishopp. The UT rejected Sales J’s analysis. If Parliament had
intended to allow the FTT to consider public law issues in such a manner, it would have expressly
done so and subjected the jurisdiction to do so to specific conditions, as it did in the case of the
UT.28 This reasoning has found support subsequently in differently constituted panels of the UT.29
Although not expressly rejecting Oxfam,30 the Court of Appeal in Trustees of the BT Pension
Scheme v HMRC (Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme)31 similarly noted that “when one of the
tax tribunals was intended to be able to determine public law claims Parliament made that
expressly clear”.32 Indeed, it is a strong argument that as Parliament has not provided a key to
the front door, it would be inappropriate to imply that one can sneak in through the back. More
recently, the Court of Appeal in Samarkand Film Partnership No.3 and others v HMRC
(Samarkand)33 also noted that the FTT did not have jurisdiction to consider the lawfulness of a
possible breach of legitimate expectation by HMRC.34 However, it was not argued otherwise by
the parties in the case and so the Court of Appeal did not expressly reject Oxfam.35
In brief, the current position is that the First-tier Tax Tribunal (FT Tax Tribunal) may only
consider public law complaints where a statutory provision allows it to do so. How broadly such
provisions can be read is the subject of conflicting judgments36 at the same level of authority,37
though a restrictive reading has found more favour in recent years.
Reasons to amend the law
It will be argued in this section that the current constraint on allowing public law claims to be
heard in the tribunals is overly restrictive. This becomes evident when one considers the policy
behind this restriction, the competence of the tribunals, the practical advantages to loosening the
restriction and the arguments against such a move. These matters will be considered in turn.
Policy behind the restriction
Given that jurisdiction to hear public law claims is governed by statute, it is worth considering
the reason why the primary governing statute, TCEA 2007, only allows for the tribunals to
26Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch).
27Noor, above fn.23, [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC).
28Noor, above fn.23, [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC) at [29], [76]–[78].
29Reed Employment plc and others v HMRC [2014] UKUT 160 (TCC) at [343]; [2014] STC 1982 at 2068. The UT
in British Disabled Flying Association v HMRC [2013] UKUT 162 (TCC) at [52]; [2013] STC 1677 at 1689 also
adopted the reasoning in Noor, above fn.23, [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC), but without giving reasons for doing so.
30Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch).
31Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme v HMRC [2015] EWCA Civ 713; [2016] STC 66.
32Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, above fn.31, [2015] EWCA Civ 713 at [143].
33Samarkand Film Partnership No.3 and others v HMRC [2017] EWCA Civ 77; [2017] STC 926.
34Samarkand, above fn.33, [2017] EWCA Civ 77 at [2].
35Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch).
36 It has been claimed that the cases can be reconciled. For instance, in Rotberg v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 657 (TC);
Garrod v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 353 (TC). Compare: Sygma Security Systems v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 329 (TC).
37On which, see Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2010] UKUT 454 (AAC); [2011] MHLR 37 at [40].
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consider public law issues in limited circumstances. The Report of the Review of Tribunals by
Sir Andrew Leggatt (the Leggatt Report),38 which brought about the formalisation of the tribunals
regime in 2007, did little to elaborate upon why FTTs such as the tax tribunal should not be
entitled to deal with issues of judicial review. The Leggatt Report notes merely that it was
suggested in the case of the VAT and Duties Tribunals that they might usefully exercise a judicial
review function at first instance.39 This was rejected however “[i]f only for reasons of the greater
complexity of the procedure”.40
Reason for restricting the scope of the tribunals’ jurisdiction can be found in the debates on
the underlying Bill in both Houses of Parliament. It was perceived that the tribunals lacked
sufficient expertise. For instance, at the third reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, several
members expressed their opinion that judicial review should only be exercised by those with
expertise in such matters. Lord Campbell noted that the exercise of discretion in judicial review
cases called for “judicial expertise”.41 At the second sitting of the Public Bill Committee, Vera
Baird (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs at the time)
acknowledged that the purpose of allowing transfers from the High Court to the UT in selected
cases was to
“harness the expertise that is likely to be available in that forum on the special kinds of
business that the tribunal system takes care of”.42
Indeed, in the Explanatory Notes to the Act, it is noted that the provision would
“allow the parties to have the benefit of the specialist expertise of the Upper Tribunal in
cases similar to those with which the Upper Tribunal routinely deals in the exercise of its
statutory appellate jurisdiction”.43
Importantly it is not a requirement that judicial review matters can only be considered by the
UT where the panel is formed solely of High Court judges,44 although there must be one “judge”
of the UT sitting on the panel.45 “Judges” of the UT are appointed on the recommendation of the
Lord Chancellor and must have significant experience in the law (such as seven years of practice
as a barrister or solicitor).46 As such, what is relevant is expertise in dealing with issues of public
law, not the particular profession or role of the relevant decision-maker. In this respect, an
amendment to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill which would have meant that cases
38Leggatt Report, above fn.21.
39Leggatt Report, above fn.21, para.6.8.
40Leggatt Report, above fn.21, para.6.8.
41Hansard, HL Deb, Vol 689, col 1007 (20 February 2007).
42Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill 15 March 2007 col.37.
43Explanatory Notes to Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, para.122.
44See Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31A(3). This can be contrasted with TCEA 2007 s.18(8) which provides that a High
Court judge or a judge of the Court of Session must preside where there is a judicial review of an unappealable
First-tier decision (“or such other persons as may be agreed from time to time between the Lord Chief Justice, the
Lord President, or the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, as the case may be, and the Senior President of
Tribunals”). On which, see classes of cases specified under section 18(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Act 2007 (Practice Direction), s.2(b).
45Composition of Tribunals in relation to matters that fall to be decided by the Tax chamber of the First-tier Tribunal
and the Finance and Tax Chamber of the Upper Tribunal on or after 1 April 2009 (Practice Statement) s.11.
46TCEA 2007 Sch.3, para.1(2).
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could be transferred only to the UT where the panel consisted only of High Court judges was
rejected on the basis that persons other than High Court judges could be sufficiently competent
to deal with public law issues.47
If the purpose of restricting who can hear judicial review claims is that such matters should
only be dealt with by the persons who are properly competent to do so, then it follows that the
competence of the FT Tax Tribunal should be analysed. If it can be shown that the body has
sufficient expertise to consider public law matters, then the rationale for restricting the body’s
jurisdiction falls away.
Competence of the First-tier Tax Tribunal
Dr Avery Jones has argued that the FT Tax Tribunal ought to be entitled to hear public law
issues48: not as a matter of “principle”,49 but rather because the Tribunal already hears public law
issues.50 That the body has the practical expertise to consider matters of public law is a strong
argument for extending the jurisdiction of the FTT. Indeed, it is this logic that resulted in the
extension of the UT’s jurisdiction to include cases of judicial review. To this end, if it can be
shown that the FTT has the requisite expertise, then it too should be permitted to consider judicial
review cases.
Although the classification is not without difficulty,51 it is orthodox to start by noting that there
are three primary grounds when discussing the grounds for review. These are: illegality;
unreasonableness; and procedural impropriety.52 Proportionality and legitimate expectation are
both claims that can be made in judicial review proceedings, but whether these are subsumed
under the aforementioned three primary grounds or constitute their own independent grounds
for review is a matter of continuing debate.53 In tax cases at least, legitimate expectation claims
are generally dealt with as an independent ground for review.54 If it can be demonstrated that the
FTT is already endowed with the jurisdiction to consider issues in respect of all the different
grounds for review, then it follows that the body has the requisite expertise to consider public
law issues generally. This article will approach this task by demonstrating that the FTT is already
47Hansard, HL Deb, Vol 689, cols 1007–1009 (20 February 2007).
48 J.F. Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals: a story of uncompleted business” [2006] BTR 282, 291–293;
Avery Jones, above fn.4, 13.
49Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn.48, 291; Avery Jones, above fn.4, 13.
50Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn.48, 291; Avery Jones, above fn.4, 13.
51M. Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 497. Sarah Nason has also proposed a different
taxonomy: see S. Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016).
52Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (Council of Civil Service Unions) [1985] AC 374
at 410 (Lord Diplock); [1985] ICR 14 (HL).
53For instance in R. v IRC Ex p. Unilever plc (Unilever) [1996] STC 681 (CA) it was regarded by Lord Justice Simon
Brown that legitimate expectation claims could be subsumed under the banner of “Wednesbury unreasonableness”.
See the discussion in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1591 on
the differences between proportionality and reasonableness.
54See, for instance, R. (on the application of Davies and another) v HMRC; R. (on the application of Gaines-Cooper)
v HMRC (Davies and Gaines-Cooper) [2011] UKSC 47;Cameron and others v HMRC [2012] EWHC 1174 (Admin);
[2012] STC 1691; R. (on the application of Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC [2015] EWHC 3261 (Admin). It should be
noted that breach of a legitimate expectation does not itself provide a successful claim; it must additionally be proved
that the breach of the expectation is conspicuously unfair (Unilever, above fn.53, [1996] STC 681 (CA) at 697 (Simon
Brown LJ)) such that it amounts to an abuse of power. In this sense, it would be more correct for the courts to use the
heading “abuse of power” rather than “legitimate expectation”.
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endowed with responsibility for considering public law issues under the different heads of review.
Although these heads cover a wide spectrum of potential claims, the important point is that under
each head the critical judicial task is the balancing of public law considerations.While this article
will only look at a few selected examples, it can be extrapolated from these examples that the
FTT is also more generally competent. Finally, it should be noted that in his article for the British
Tax Review cited above, Dr Avery Jones highlighted briefly some circumstances in which the
lower Tribunal may deal with public law issues.55 This section should in this sense be seen as
further developing Dr Avery Jones’ argument.
Illegality
Illegality is a broad category which encompasses those decisions made without authority by
public bodies. It applies to situations for instance where the decision-maker has used a power
for an improper purpose, has taken account of irrelevant considerations (or failed to take account
of relevant considerations), has unlawfully delegated decision-making power, or has fettered
their own discretion.56 Importantly, there are statutory provisions which entitle the FTT to consider
the “illegality” of HMRC actions in respect of these situations. Paragraph 3A of Schedule 1AB
to the TaxesManagement Act 1970, for instance, sets out the requirements for a claim to “special
relief” (specifically, a claim for repayment of tax more than four years after the end of the relevant
tax year). HMRC are not required to repay the tax unless three conditions are satisfied.57Condition
A is the relevant condition for present purposes and provides that “in the opinion of the
Commissioners it would be unconscionable for the Commissioners to seek to recover the amount”.
This requires the Tribunal to take account of judicial review principles,58 including whether or
not the Commissioners’ discretionary power has been used for an improper purpose.59Meanwhile,
section 16(4) of the Finance Act 1994 (FA 1994) requires the Tribunal to ascertain whether
irrelevant considerations have been taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of an
HMRC Officer in refusing to restore seized goods.60
Unreasonableness
Where litigants attempt to challenge the “reasonableness” of decisions in judicial review
proceedings, their challenge goes more towards the merits of a particular decision. In relation
to this ground, the FTT is given jurisdiction by various statutory provisions to assess the
“reasonableness” of HMRC actions. Section 16(4) FA 1994 permits the FTT to consider whether
the refusal by an Officer of the UK Border Force (following a review) to restore items seized at
55Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn.48, 291, fn.54; Avery Jones, above fn.4, 13, fn.42.
56Turpin and Tomkins, above fn.5, 669–677.
57TMA 1970 Sch.1AB, para.3A(3).
58See Pegasus Birds Ltd v CC&E [1999] STC 95 (QB) at 101.
59Donald Fitzroy Currie v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 882 (TC) at [29]. See alsoQualapharm Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKFTT
100 (TC) at [42] where it was speculated that the Tribunal could consider whether a penalty has been issued for an
“improper purpose”.
60Lindsay v CC&E [2002] EWCA Civ 267 at [40] (Lord Phillips). See also CC&E v JH Corbitt (Numismatists) Ltd
[1981] AC 22 (HL) at 40 (Lord Lane).
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the border was a decision which “could not reasonably have [been] arrived at”.61 Elsewhere,
section 83(1) VATA 1994 in certain circumstances allows the FTT to assess the reasonableness
with which HMRC have exercised their statutory discretion. By way of background, a taxable
person is not entitled to input tax credit unless that person holds a tax invoice. However, HMRC
have a statutory discretion to allow credit for input tax notwithstanding that the registered person
does not hold such a tax invoice.62 The FTT has supervisory jurisdiction to review the
reasonableness of the exercise of this discretion.63
Procedural impropriety
TheHumanRights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) made a considerable change to the public law landscape
by allowing litigants to take cases in UK courts considering infringements of the European
Convention onHumanRights (ECHR). By virtue of section 3HRA1998, primary and subordinate
legislationmust be read and given effect to in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.
As Mosedale J has noted in LH Bishop Electric Co Ltd v HMRC (LH Bishop):
“The effect of this is that primary and secondary legislation must be read in so far as possible
as consistent with the Convention. This goes well beyond giving legislation a purposive
interpretation: the legislationmust be read as consistent with the Convention if at all possible
to do so.”64
Importantly, this requires the FTT to construe legislation in light of Article 6 ECHR which
applies to administrative proceedings that determine the “civil rights and obligations [of an
individual] or of any criminal charge against him”.65 In such a case, the person concerned is
“entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal”.66 Article 6 also guarantees minimum rights for those persons charged with a criminal
offence, such as to be informed in detail and promptly of the nature and scope of the accusation.
These obligations overlap (and at times extend)67 those required at common law in respect of
procedural propriety. To this end, Article 6 imposes procedural fairness requirements upon
certain acts of HMRC which are in turn subject to the jurisdiction of the FTT. Cases in which
procedural impropriety issues using Article 6 have been raised include Aqua Products Ltd v
HMRC68 (whether a 30 day time limit in which to appeal infringes the appellant’s Convention
rights), Lindsay Hackett v HMRC69 (whether HMRC’s decision to proceed by way of personal
61On which, see Juliet Forster-Copperi v Director of Border Revenue [2016] UKFTT 157 (TC);Mr S M Imran Bakht
v Director of Border Revenue [2014] UKFTT 551 (TC); Brian Talbot v Director of Border Revenue [2012] UKFTT
381 (TC).
62 See Kohanzad v CC&E (Kohanzad) [1994] STC 967 (QB) at 969 (Schiemann J) on how to interpret the Value
Added Tax Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/2518) reg.29(2).
63 Kohanzad, above fn.62, [1994] STC 967 (QB); Best Buys Supplies Ltd v HMRC [2011] UKUT 497 (TCC) at
[49]–[50]; [2012] STC 885 at [49]–[50].
64LH Bishop Electric Co Ltd v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC) at [190].
65Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Rome, 4.XI.1950, Art.6, para.1.
66ECHR, above fn.65, Art.6, para.1.
67H.W. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 405.
68Aqua Products Ltd v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 340 (TC).
69Lindsay Hackett v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 781 (TC).
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liability notice infringed Article 6), David Ainsworth v HMRC70 (whether a Tribunal hearing
should be in camera), and Westminster College of Computing Ltd v HMRC71 (whether a failure
to give a taxpayer sufficient time to prepare his case amounted to an infringement of Article 6).
Proportionality
Proportionality may be either a distinct ground for judicial review, or may be largely subsumed
within “reasonableness”.What is uncontroversial is that proportionality analysis will be engaged
where EU law or ECHR rights are concerned. In De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing and others (De Freitas),72 the test for proportionality
was formulated as follows:
“whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally
connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is
necessary to accomplish the objective”.73
For present purposes, it is sufficient to briefly note that the FTT must engage in proportionality
analysis when considering the purported infringement of rights under the ECHR.74 The FTTmust
also engage in proportionality analysis in respect of EU law.75
Legitimate expectation
Lord Carnwath in the Privy Council case of The United Policyholders Group and others v The
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (United Policyholders)76 surveyed the cases concerning
the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the accompanying academic commentary before
summarising the doctrine as follows:
“Where a promise or representation, which is ‘clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant
qualification’, has been given to an identifiable defined person or group by a public authority
for its own purposes, either in return for action by the person or group, or on the basis of
which the person or group has acted to its detriment, the court will require it to be honoured,
unless the authority is able to show good reasons, judged by the court to be proportionate,
to resile from it. In judging proportionality the court will take into account any conflict with
wider policy issues, particularly those of a ‘macro-economic’ or ‘macro-political’ kind.”77
70David Ainsworth v HMRC [2017] UKFTT 850 (TC).
71Westminster College of Computing Ltd v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 669 (TC).
72De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing and others [1999] 1
AC 69 (Privy Council (Antigua and Barbuda)).
73De Freitas, above fn.72, [1999] 1 AC 69 (Privy Council (Antigua and Barbuda)) at 80.
74See for instance Trinity Mirror plc v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 355 (TC); Rockliff v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 162 (TC).
75 For instance, see Highland Wood Energy Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 420 (TC); Imperial College of Science,
Technology and Medicine v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 33 (TC).
76 The United Policyholders Group and others v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] UKPC 17;
[2016] 1 WLR 3383 (Privy Council (Trinidad and Tobago)).
77United Policyholders, above fn.76, [2016] UKPC 17 (Privy Council (Trinidad and Tobago)) at [121] (Lord Carnwath).
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Although the FTT has no “general supervisory jurisdiction”78 and hence cannot generally hear
legitimate expectation cases, there are nevertheless circumstances where it can consider issues
which usually come within the ambit of that doctrine. In Spring Salmon & Seafood Ltd v HMRC
(Spring Salmon)79 for instance, the FTT considered whether HMRCwere prevented from pursuing
tax due owing to a prior agreement between the taxpayer and HMRC. The FTT ultimately held
against the taxpayer on the point, finding that there was no agreement which arose upon which
the taxpayer could rely.80 However, the FTT adopted the same approach as would be taken when
considering claims under the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The FTT approached the issue
by looking at three separate facets: the terms of any agreement; whether the conditions of such
an agreement had been satisfied; and whether the agreement was implemented.81 In the language
of legitimate expectation, this would equate to asking whether there was a representation made
which was clear, unambiguous and devoid of qualification upon which the taxpayer could and
did rely. In rejecting the claim, the FTT used language which is to be found in legitimate
expectation cases, noting that the assurance given by HMRC was “guarded” and “qualified”
thereby preventing an agreement from arising.82
Further, the analysis which was deployed in respect of the ECHR in relation to “procedural
impropriety”, as referred to above,83 can be used here to demonstrate that the FTT may consider
legitimate expectations in certain circumstances. Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR
protects the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”, within which a claim for a substantive legitimate
expectation can be made. A legitimate expectation claim must be incidental to a property right
in order for it to garner the protection of the First Protocol.84 Thus, if a property right is present,85
for instance such as a right to recover input tax,86 a claim to a legitimate expectation can be
considered by the FTT.87
Practical advantages to loosening the restriction
Having identified that the policy underlying the restriction of the ability of the FTT to consider
public law matters is based on expertise, and having established that the FTT is competent to
adjudicate on such matters, it still needs to be established what exactly would be the benefit of
broadening the jurisdiction of the FTT. Primarily, the benefit would be that it would no longer
be necessary to maintain two separate sets of proceedings dealing with different sides or aspects
78 See HMRC v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) at [36], [41]; [2013] STC 225 at 234, 235; Oxfam, above fn.9,
[2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch); [2010] STC 686 at 712; Noor, above fn.23, [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC) at [30].
79Spring Salmon & Seafood Ltd v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC).
80Spring Salmon, above fn.79, [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC) at [258]–[270].
81Spring Salmon, above fn.79, [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC) at [259].
82Spring Salmon, above fn.79, [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC) at [263].
83See above, “Procedural impropriety”, in text at fn.63 onwards.
84Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany (42527/98) [2001] ECHR 463 at [83].
85See R. (on the application of Carvill) v IRC [2003] STC 1539 (QB) at [49].
86On which, see Bulves AD v Bulgaria (3991/03) [2009] STC 1193; Aleena Electronics Ltd v HMRC [2011] UKFTT
608 (TC) at [38]–[44].
87What amounts to a possession for tax purposes was recently considered by Lord Justice McCombe in R. (on the
Application of Rowe and Others) v HMRC; R. (on the Application of Vital Nut Co Ltd and Others) v HMRC (Rowe
and Vital Nut) [2017] EWCA Civ 2105; [2017] WLR(D) 830 at [158]–[185].
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of the same case. This would have important practical advantages and could also be supported
by an argument based on deference.
Fundamentally then, the great advantage of this proposal is that it would dispense with the
need for two sets of proceedings with each considering different aspects of the same case. There
is a “clear public benefit” in allowing the FTT to consider public law points as it is well positioned
to make judgements about the fair treatment of taxpayers and this reduces cost, delay, potential
injustice and confusion.88 Having the one tribunal hear arguments on two separate points, one
going to substance and the other going to public law concerns, allows that tribunal to consider
whether findings of fact are necessary for determining both points, or whether a finding on one
point will vitiate the need to make a finding on the other. As noted by Lord Justice Hughes (as
he then was) in Davies & Anr v HMRC (Davies)89:
“it is undoubtedly good general practice to ensure, so far as possible, that a challenge in
law by way of judicial review is mounted on the basis of known facts”.90
The tribunal could then also apply its expertise in deciding which issues ought to be resolved
first, as the resolution of one might render resolution of the other redundant!91 This would avoid
precisely the situation which arose in the joined cases of R. (on the application of Davies and
another) v HMRC; R. (on the application of Gaines-Cooper) v HMRC (Davies and
Gaines-Cooper).92 In the Supreme Court, the two sets of judicial review proceedings were heard
together. The procedural history of the two cases was, however, quite distinct. The first appellants
had stayed the substantive hearing until after the judicial review whilst the second appellant had
pursued the substantive appeal and thereafter instituted judicial review proceedings. Given that
a successful judicial review would render redundant the investment of time and resources by
HMRC in challenging the substantive case, LordWilson labelled it “unfortunate” that the course
taken in the case of the first appellants was not taken in the case of the second.93 At the same
time, hearing the substantive appeal first would also pre-empt and for all intents and purposes
determine the outcome of the judicial review proceedings, as Lord Justice Hughes noted in
Davies.94
The prudence of extending the jurisdiction of the FTT to consideration of issues of public law
where they are relevant to the resolution of a dispute is of particular importance today. HMRC
have acquired a series of novel powers which seek to nudge taxpayers away from tax avoidance
activities and also away from delaying the collection of tax by engaging in litigation. Crucially,
where these powers are challenged by taxpayers, there may also be an underlying dispute about
how the underlying substantive law applies to the relevant facts.95 This in turn would render it
88Oxfam, above fn.9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [70].
89Davies & Anr v HMRC [2008] EWCA Civ 933; [2008] STC 2813.
90Davies, above fn.89, [2008] EWCA Civ 933 at [7].
91On which, see Reed Employment plc v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 596 (TC) at [18]–[27], in particular at [24].
92Davies and Gaines-Cooper, above fn.54, [2011] UKSC 47.
93Davies and Gaines-Cooper, above fn.54, [2011] UKSC 47 at [6].
94Davies, above fn.89, [2008] EWCA Civ 933 at [17]–[18].
95 In addition to accelerated payment notices (and partner payment notices), one could also consider follower notices,
the General Anti-Abuse Rule and its penalty regime, and the serial tax avoidance regime. The disclosure of tax
avoidance scheme and promoters of tax avoidance scheme rules are also a means of nudging in this manner particularly
when used as a proxy for determining whether notices (accelerated, partner or follower) requiring the upfront payment
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prudent to have one forum consider both sets of issues. For instance, consider the introduction
of accelerated payment notices (APNs). The APN regime broadly requires that taxpayers pay
disputed tax up front, before being able to challenge HMRC’s assessment through the normal
channels. APNs may be issued where the following conditions are present96:
1. either an enquiry or an appeal are in progress;
2. a tax advantage accrues from the particular arrangements; and
3. a follower notice has been issued97; the arrangements are disclosure of tax avoidance
schemes (DOTAS) notifiable98; or a General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR)
counteraction notice has been issued.99
Once an APN has been issued to the taxpayer, the money becomes payable within 90 days.100
There is no right of appeal against the APN, but merely the right to make representations to
HMRC, as a means only of objecting either to the satisfaction of the conditions or to the amount
submitted to be due.101 After taking into account the representations, HMRC may refuse to
withdraw the APN.102 If an APN has been issued to a taxpayer who entered into the once popular
film schemes, the amount due could well be into the hundreds of thousands of pounds.103Taxpayers
are left with little option but to fight the APN, but without any right of appeal against the APN
being available, the only route which can be taken is through the Administrative Court. Partner
payment notices (PPNs) are almost identical to APNs but apply to parties who have invested
through partnerships.104
As of March 2017, 87 judicial review applications had been launched in relation to APNs and
PPNs, with 4,116 applicants or potential applicants seeking interim relief from APNs/PPNs
which HMRC’s records show amounted to a total sum in excess of £756 million.105 Importantly
for the purposes of this article, these judicial review applications relate to cases where there are
in addition substantive disputes between the parties,106 with the likelihood that many would
proceed to the FTT by way of appeal. Crucially there must be genuine substance to HMRC’s
claim for tax. In R. (on the Application of Rowe and Others) v HMRC; R. (on the Application of
of tax should be issued. A recent discussion paper from the IFS helpfully highlights the development of these “new”
regulatory powers. See T. Bowler, The implications of recent additions to HMRC powers and the shifting balance in
the relationship with taxpayers (The Tax Law Review Committee, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 20 November
2017).
96FA 2014 s.219.
97See FA 2014 s.204.
98See FA 2014 s.219(5) and FA 2004 ss.311 and 312.
99See FA 2013 Sch.43, para.12.
100FA 2014 s.223(4) and 223(5). Where representations have been made, this can have the effect of delaying the date
for repayment by up to 30 days.
101FA 2014 s.222.
102FA 2014 s.222(4).
103 See, for instance, A. Palin, “Tax schemes: HMRC urged to stop bankrupting investors”, Financial Times, 20
November 2015, London.
104 See FA 2014 s.228 and Sch.32. See also HMRC, Compliance checks series — CC/FS24 (last updated 17 March
2017), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/580530/CC-FS24
-11-16.pdf [Accessed 8 February 2018], 1.
105R. (on the applications of VVB Engineering Services Ltd) v HMRC [2017] EWHC 506 (Admin) at [10].
106See FA 2014 s.219 and Sch.32 para.2.
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Vital Nut Co Ltd and Others) v HMRC (Rowe and Vital Nut),107 the Court of Appeal confirmed
that an APN or PPN could not be issued anytime that a scheme had been notified under DOTAS.
Rather, such a notice could only be issued where HMRC had been positively satisfied that the
scheme notified under DOTAS would also be ineffective.108 This was because the amount of tax
that must be paid up front, known as the “disputed tax”, is to be determined by a designated
officer in HMRC using the “best of the officer’s information and belief”.109 The Court of Appeal
read this as requiring “the designated officer to be positively satisfied on the information that
he then has that the scheme is not effective”.110
Thus, it is necessary for the court to make a determination as to whether or not there is merit
in HMRC’s claim that the tax is due. With APNs accordingly, there is a clear case for allowing
the FTT to consider the merits of a public law point. The FTT will be hearing the substantive
dispute in any event but also importantly findings of fact can lead to the resolution of both
disputes. Given the interdependence of the issues, it would be prudent in such a case to extend
the jurisdiction of the FTT to allow it to consider the public law issues.111 The FTT could exercise
its expertise in order to decide which issues ought to be resolved first.112
The justification for extending the jurisdiction of the FTT where there is a substantive dispute
may also be buttressed by an argument based on “deference”. One of the most basic purposes
of administrative law is the allocation of responsibility for decision-making. The role of the court
in judicial review is generally not to decide what the correct decision should be but to decide
upon whether the processes that led to that decision were proper.113 This does not prevent the
courts entirely from intruding upon the merits of a decision: some decisions are unreasonable
for instance and may be overturned.114But the degree to which the courts may intervene in respect
of the merits of a decision is controlled by the principle of deference: that the courts should defer
to the decision arrived at by the official or entity vested with the decision-making power. As
Endicott points out,115 this process of not second-guessing decisions is justified on the basis of
the legal allocation of power (that officials, and not the courts, have been vested with the power
by a sovereign Parliament), expertise (the official will be institutionally competent to take the
107Rowe and Vital Nut, above fn.87, [2017] EWCA Civ 2105.
108Rowe and Vital Nut, above fn.87, [2017] EWCA Civ 2105 at [62] and [220].
109FA 2014 s.221(3) and Sch.32 para.4.
110Rowe and Vital Nut, above fn.87, [2017] EWCA Civ 2105 at [62]. This overturned the onus of proof established
by the High Court in R. (on the application of Vital Nut Co Ltd) v HMRC [2016] EWHC 1797 (Admin) at [35]; [2016]
4 WLR 144.
111The same case can be made in respect, for instance, of the operation of the diverted profits tax (DPT), which aims
to counteract contrived arrangements used by large groups that result in the erosion of the UK tax base (Explanatory
Notes to FA 2015 s.77). As with the APN regime, taxpayers are required to pay disputed tax up front where a charging
notice has been issued pursuant to the DPT provisions (see generally FA 2015 Pt 3) and, similarly, it is a prerequisite
to the issuance of a notice that the relevant HMRC officer believes tax to be due as a matter of substantive law (on
this, see, for instance,Glencore, above fn.3, [2017] EWCA Civ 1716 at [73]–[78]; [2017] WLR(D) 723). To this end,
there is a substantive tax law dispute in addition to a potential judicial review claim, where the determination in the
former would be an important factor in the resolution of the latter.
112On which, see Hankinson v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 384 (TC) at [114]–[115].
113Council of Civil Service Unions, above fn.52, [1985] ICR 14 (HL) at 28–29 (Lord Fraser), 33–34 (Lord Scarman),
39 (Lord Diplock), 41–42 (Lord Roskill), 50–51 (Lord Brightman).
114Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). See also Senior Courts Act
1981 s.31(5A) which allows a judge to reconsider a quashed decision.
115T. Endicott, Administrative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 234–236.
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decision), political responsibility (the processes for political accountability for decisions will be
established in the case of the official) and processes (courts are constrained by rules of judicial
process, such as rules on evidence, as to what factors are relevant for a decision, whereas the
primary decision-maker will have greater resources and capabilities for obtaining information,
and will be more attuned accordingly to the relevant information).
This idea of deference to decision-makers is, however, turned on its head in the case of the
FTT which is a body staffed by tax experts who are acutely attuned to the vagaries of HMRC
actions. Dealing with Endicott’s four concerns in order: 1. The FTT has been legally allocated
power to adjudicate upon disputes concerning HMRC and taxpayers. 2. It has unique institutional
competence and expertise. 3. HMRC are a non-ministerial governmental bodywhich, as articulated
elsewhere,116 are lacking in oversight mechanisms; broadening the jurisdiction of the FTT would
then, in fact, enhance the accountability of HMRC and its staff. 4. The FTT adjudicates disputes
de novo and as such does step into the shoes of the primary decision-maker, equipped with all
the relevant information to arrive at a decision. That the FTT satisfies these conditions is in fact
another reason why it ought to be extended the opportunity to consider public law issues.
Counter-arguments
Having established a positive case for extending the jurisdiction of the FTT, it is worth considering
the counter-arguments. A potential reason for restricting the ability to hear public law claims is
the problem of “complexity”, which was highlighted in the Leggatt Report. The formalisation
of the tribunals’ regime was intended to introduce a clear, streamlined approach to appeals
through the tribunals.117 Allowing public law claims to be raised in the FTT only, but not, for
instance, in the Immigration or Employment Tribunals, undermines this consistency and adds
complexity. In response, the status quo already creates unnecessary complexity for the ordinary
taxpayer who may have to participate in two separate sets of proceedings in different courts.
Furthermore, this objection overlooks the point that some public law claims can already be
brought in the FTT.118
A second counter-argument is that there is already a mechanism for having one tribunal,
namely the UT, consider all matters, both substantive and public law points, which are relevant
to the resolution of a dispute between HMRC and the taxpayer. The judicial review case can be
transferred from the Administrative Court to the UT, whilst the substantive appeal can be
transferred from the FTT to the UT.119 This argument, however, neglects the fact that the FTT is
expert in making determinations of fact, whilst appeal to the UT traditionally lies only on points
of law. The proposal in this article is to broaden the jurisdiction of the FTT where there is a
substantive dispute, which in turn requires determinations of fact. Although the UT can make
factual determinations, and indeed High Court judges often hear witness evidence, it is the
116S. Daly, “Oversight of HMRC Soft Law: Lessons from the Ombudsman” (2016) 38(3) Journal of Social Welfare
and Family Law 343.
117See for instance the Leggatt Report, above fn.21, para.6.2.
118 It is notable also that the scope of the FTT’s jurisdiction still confuses members of the Administrative Court. See
S. Daly, “Fairness in tax law and revenue guidance: R. (Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC” [2016] BTR 18, 20.
119 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/273) r.28 allows for a transfer of a
“complex case” with the permission of the parties.
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constitution of the FTT which makes it more expert in relation to making such determinations.
In this sense, the counter-argument that the UT could, hypothetically, hear both the judicial
review case and the substantive case misses a critical component of this proposal. Disputes
should be resolved in the forum best placed to do so, and in this case that is the FTT.
A third, more powerful counter-argument relates to practicality. Tribunals are intended to be,
inter alia, quicker, cheaper and more informal than the courts.120 Allowing judicial review claims
wholesale would place an extreme burden upon the tribunal system. The ability to petition for
judicial review is generally restricted quite heavily by virtue of a filtering system which imposes
a significant threshold before a claimmay proceed. As set out by JudgeMosedale in LH Bishop,121
Parliament cannot have intended that challenges to, effectively, the fairness of a provision be
brought in an unrestricted manner.122By limiting such claims to judicial review, thereby retaining
a permission filter to weed out unmeritorious claims, it could be said that there is merit in
preventing the Tribunal from hearing public law issues without limit.123 Again, this argument
also misses the point of this proposal. It is not intended that the jurisdiction of the FTT should
be extended generally to consider public law issues. It is only intended that the FTT should be
entitled to consider public law issues where they relate to an additional substantive dispute. If
the claim on the public law issue is unmeritorious, the FTT can easily dismiss it when considering
the other issues. The proposal then would not place any significant additional burden upon the
FTT. In this sense, all that remains of this objection is that there would be an augmentation of
taxpayers’ access to justice in respect of protection against impropriety on HMRC’s part. That,
however, is a good thing.
A fourth related contention would be that extending the scope of the FTT’s jurisdiction in
such a manner creates a sort of tax “opt-out” whereby the ordinary procedural rules of judicial
review, such as the rule that judicial review proceedings must be instituted within 90 days of the
relevant decision,124 do not apply. But again, this proposal only seeks to extend jurisdiction where
there is a substantive dispute. In this scenario, if there is a good claim in judicial review, it infects
HMRC’s argument. For instance, where there is a dispute about whether tax is due, the taxpayer’s
argument may be that tax is not due both in law and because they had a legitimate expectation
based upon an express assurance from HMRC. HMRC’s claim that tax is due could accordingly
fail nevertheless, even if correct in terms of the substantive tax law, because of a public law
claim.125 Whether tax could be due or not is a matter of public law and substantive tax law. The
two are inextricably linked. That HMRC should be able to claim tax that is not due simply
because of the expiration of a restrictive time limit is unfair. It should further be recalled that
some public law issues can already be heard in the FTT. In this sense, there is already a sort of
tax “opt-out”.Moreover, it should be noted that taxpayers must generally appeal HMRC decisions
120Elliott and Thomas, above fn.51, 687; Lord Chancellor’s Department: Committee on Administrative Tribunals and
Enquiries (Franks Committee), Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (HMSO, 1957),
Cmnd.218, para.38.
121LH Bishop, above fn.64, [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC).
122LH Bishop, above fn.64, [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC) at [143]–[146].
123LH Bishop, above fn.64, [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC) at [143]–[146].
124CPR r.54.5(1)(a) and (b).
125Though significant hurdles would remain. See Davies, above fn.89, [2008] EWCA Civ 933 at [18].
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within 30 days.126 If a taxpayer is seeking to appeal a decision of HMRC, the public law ground
that they may additionally seek to pursue will generally relate to that decision. In this sense, the
taxpayer will likely come within the 90 day rule anyway.
Finally, it is tempting to argue that there is something intrinsically superior about the ability
of the higher courts to consider public law issues.127 In response, it is worth noting that, when
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill was being scrutinised by Parliament, the Lord Chief
Justice rejected the idea that only High Court judges have the requisite knowledge to consider
issues of public law.128 Indeed Baroness Ashton in the House of Lords supported the Lord Chief
Justice’s view, particularly given the expertise of members of the tax tribunals.129 Furthermore,
the courts too are liable to misconceive public law issues. In the case of R. (on the application
of Ingenious Media Holdings plc and another) v HMRC (Ingenious Media),130 HMRC defended
disclosures of confidential taxpayer information on the basis that such actions fell within its
managerial discretion.131 This was accepted by the High Court132 and unanimously by the Court
of Appeal,133 but rejected thereafter unanimously by the Supreme Court.134 Lord Toulson, giving
the only judgment of the Court, remarked that the “whole idea of HMRC officials supplying
confidential information about individuals to the media on a non-attributable basis is, or should
be, a matter of serious concern”135 and regarded the justifications for HMRC’s actions, which
were accepted by the High Court and Court of Appeal, “as far too tenuous to justify”136 disclosing
confidential information.
The mechanics of the proposed reform
Having established the case for extending the jurisdiction of the FTT to consider public law
points where there is an additional substantial dispute, the remaining matter relates to how this
reform would operate. There are three potential avenues which could be explored. The first,
126See for instance TMA 1970 s.31A(b). More generally, on timings in direct tax disputes, see HMRC, InternalManual,
Appeals reviews and tribunals guidance, ARTG2220, “Reviews and appeals for direct taxes: Appealing against a
decision: Customer does not reply to the decision within the time limits” (10 August 2016), available at: https://www
.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/appeals-reviews-and-tribunals-guidance/artg2220 [Accessed 8 February 2018]. On
indirect tax disputes, see HMRC, Internal Manual, Appeals reviews and tribunals guidance, ARTG3120, “Reviews
and appeals for indirect taxes: Appealing against a decision or assessment: Time limit for making an appeal” (10
August 2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/appeals-reviews-and-tribunals-guidance
/artg3120 [Accessed 8 February 2018].
127 Note, however, that even the Magistrates’ Court may consider public law issues. See Pawlowski (Collector of
Taxes) v Dunnington [1999]WL 250041; [1999] STC 550 (CA). On which, see J. Tiley and G. Loutzenhiser, Revenue
Law, 8th edn (Bloomsbury, 2016), 79.
128Letter of 7 February 2007 to Baroness Ashton in relation to amendment tabled by Lords Lloyd and Kingsland to
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill. See Hansard, HL Deb, Vol 689, col 1009 (20 February 2007).
129Hansard, HL Deb, Vol 689, col 1009 (20 February 2007).
130R. (on the application of Ingenious Media Holdings plc and another) v HMRC [2016] UKSC 54; [2016] STC 2306.
131See S. Daly, “R. (Ingenious Media) v HMRC: public disclosures and HMRC’s duty of confidentiality” [2017] BTR
10.
132R. (on the application of Ingenious Media plc and another) v HMRC [2013] EWHC 3258 (Admin); [2014] STC
673.
133R. (on the application of Ingenious Media plc and another) v HMRC [2015] EWCA Civ 173; [2015] STC 1357.
134 Ingenious Media, above fn.130, [2016] UKSC 54.
135 Ingenious Media, above fn.130, [2016] UKSC 54 at [35].
136 Ingenious Media, above fn.130, [2016] UKSC 54 at [34].
Public Law in the Tax Tribunals and the Case for Reform 109
[2018] BTR, No.1 © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
narrow, option is that the rules could be amended so that the High Court could transfer a judicial
review case to the FTT where the High Court considers that it would be “just and convenient”
to do so.137 In deciding whether or not to transfer, the High Court would take into account, where
there is a substantive ongoing dispute, the advantages inherent in the fact that the FTT is well
equipped to deal with public law issues. The rules would also have to be amended so that the
FTT could offer the same remedies that the UT can now grant in relation to judicial review
applications.138 The problemwith this amendment is that taxpayers would still have to commence
separate judicial review proceedings in the High Court, which would result in their facing an
additional cost burden.139
The second, more radical option is to amend the grounds upon which an appeal to the FTT
can be made. The proposal in this article is not to seek a wholesale extension of jurisdiction, but
merely that taxpayers be allowed to make public law arguments in the FTT where there is
additionally a substantive dispute. The parameters of this proposal are accordingly defined by
two important restrictions. The first is that there must have been an “appealable decision” of
HMRC140 against which the claimant is formally appealing. The second restriction is that the
public law claim is additional to a substantive ground of appeal. As in the ESC A19 example
considered in the “Introduction” to this article, the case would, potentially, collapse on the
resolution of either dispute. If there is only a public law claim, the taxpayer must take their case
through the usual routes, either via internal review, the quasi-judicial path of the Adjudicator’s
Office and then the Parliamentary Ombudsman, or through judicial review in the courts.
Practically, this proposal would require legislative amendment of a number of provisions which
provide for appeals to the Tribunal.141 Whilst this would be straightforward in the case of some
taxes, such as value added tax142 and inheritance tax143 where appeal is provided for in a single
provision, appeal rights are more spread out across the provisions relating to other taxes.144 Finally,
in relation to the practicalities of this proposal, it needs to be specified that the FTT will act in
a supervisory capacity when deciding upon public law points, and thus cannot substitute its own
decision for that of HMRC.145 This is in keeping with the role of the courts generally in respect
137See Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31A(3).
138TCEA 2007 s.15(1).
139On this point, seeMemorandum submitted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England andWales (ICAEW)
(TRI 11) to the Public Bill Committee (March 2007), available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607
/cmpublic/tribunals/memos/ucm1102.htm [Accessed 8 February 2018], para.22; Memorandum submitted by the Low
Incomes Tax Reform Group (LITRG) (TRI 10) to the Public Bill Committee (March 2007), available at: http://www
.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmpublic/tribunals/memos/ucm1002.htm [Accessed 8 February 2018]. See
also T. Bowler, Countering Tax Avoidance in the UK: Which Way Forward? (The Tax Law Review Committee, The
Institute for Fiscal Studies, TLRC Discussion Paper No.7, February 2009), para.7.9.
140A condition proposed also by Avery Jones, see, Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn.48, 292.
141For an overview of the types of appeals that may be brought before the FTT, see HM Courts & Tribunals Service,
First-tier Tribunal Tax Chamber: Making an appeal: Explanatory leaflet (March 2015), available at: http://formfinder
.hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/t242-eng.pdf [Accessed 8 February 2018], 10.
142VATA 1994 s.83.
143 IHTA s.222.
144The right to appeal income tax decisions for instance is spread out over multiple Acts!
145 In practice in tax cases, the effect is almost indistinguishable. Where HMRC lose a judicial review, the decision is
remitted back to be considered again in light of the error highlighted in the review. It is the practical effect of the error
that will generally be the reason for the dispute. With the error eliminated, the dispute is resolved thus in the taxpayer’s
favour.
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of judicial review. An amendment will need to be made to TCEA 2007 so as to clarify that the
FTTmay only offer those remedies that can be provided by the courts generally in judicial review
proceedings. Helpfully, section 15(1) TCEA 2007 sets out these remedies.
Of course, given the judgment in Cart,146 as argued above, it might well be the case that there
is no need for legislative amendment in order to pursue this particular option. Legislative
amendment would, however, be preferable as this could better tease out the relevant procedural
issues such as the remedies that are available and the capacity in which the court ought to act.
Moreover, practically, it could be many years before a court of sufficient authority, namely the
Court of Appeal or SupremeCourt, considers thematter and sets out definitively the circumstances
in which the public law issues can be heard in the FTT.
The third and favoured proposal is a combination of both of the options referred to above.
The High Court should be given the discretion to transfer cases to the FTT where it believes this
to be just and equitable, and that public law claims can be adjoined to substantive claims. The
reason that both proposals should be adopted is that a lacuna is created between the two in the
case of regulatory actions by HMRC which are interrelated but nevertheless distinct from
substantive disputes. For instance, APNs are issued where there is a substantive dispute. The
claim that the APN ought not to have been issued is separate to the claim that the tax is not due
in the first place. So whilst the claims both relate to the same dispute, there is no additional claim
in public law that the tax is not due. For this reason, it would be necessary for the judicial review
proceedings to be transferred from the High Court. This is different from the ESC A19 example
given in the “Introduction” where the case would collapse on the resolution of either dispute in
favour of the taxpayer.
Finally, it must be questioned why there should even need to be, as envisaged by this proposal,
a substantive dispute before the taxpayer is entitled to take public law points in the FTT. It has
been argued in this article that the FTT is competent to adjudicate on matters ordinarily reserved
to the courts on judicial review. The specific mischief that this proposal addresses, however, is
the duplication and waste of having to take two separate cases to deal with one dispute. Where
a taxpayer’s only contention is that there is a public law infringement, then the ordinary routes
(internal review, the Adjudicator’s Office, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and/or the
Administrative Court) are appropriate. This author has not argued that there is some inadequacy
in relation to these routes. As noted elsewhere, the Adjudicator’s Office and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman are important tools in remedying HMRC errors and maladministration.147 Although
the high cost of judicial review proceedings will often be a significant deterrent to taxpayers,148
this cost is more to do with legal fees rather than court fees and the solution lies in legal aid or
remission of court fees149 and not in extending the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
146Cart, above fn.15, [2011] UKSC 28.
147Daly, above fn.116.
148William Bourne v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 294 (TC) at [24]. Whilst both sides to a dispute in the FTT generally bear
their own costs (compare Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/273) r.10),
the general rule for judicial review is that the losing party pays the costs (CPR r.44.3(2)).
149Civil Proceedings (Fees) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1053) Sch.2.
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Conclusion
It is unfortunate that the extension of the jurisdiction of the FTT has not yet come to pass,
particularly given that it is over a decade since Dr Avery Jones expressed the hope that the British
Tax Review would “not still be publishing articles on tribunal reform in 25 years’ time”.150 This
article has sought to make the case that the time for reform is nigh. It is proposed that the
jurisdiction of the FTT should be extended to allow the body to consider public law matters. The
justification is fourfold: first, that the underlying policy does not exclude the possibility that the
FTT should be given jurisdiction; secondly, that the FTT is indeed competent in the vagaries of
judicial review; thirdly, that there is a clear, positive case for the proposal; and, finally, that there
are no counter-arguments which undermine the case for the extension of jurisdiction.
The reform itself should combine two forms. The first is that the Administrative Court would
have discretion to transfer judicial review cases to the FT Tax Tribunal, just as it has in respect
of the UT, where there is substantive dispute. The second is that the FTT should be entitled to
hear public law claims where there is an additional ground of appeal with the result that the case
would collapse on the resolution of either dispute. Of course, a final option is that nothing is
changed and we wait a further 13 years for Dr Avery Jones’ hopeful prediction to be defeated.
150Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn.48, 293.
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